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In the early evening of Friday, 17 July 1998, three giant waves, each fif-
teen meters high, crashed into an isolated part of the coast in Sandaun
Province, Papua New Guinea. The disaster event was sudden and devas-
tating. With practically no warning, about fifty kilometers of the coast
became inundated by the waves: houses were smashed, coconut trees were
uprooted, and people were flung, helpless, into the sea. The Aitape tsu-
nami, as it came to be known, killed over 2,000 people, and many more
were left suffering.
Such disaster events are relatively common in Melanesia and the Pacific
generally. Indeed, there may well be a close connection between increasing
vulnerability to disasters and “development” in the Pacific (see McEntire
1999). The number of organizations that seek to provide relief in disaster
situations also appears to be on the rise. These organizations are diverse,
operating on a variety of scales and within disparate organizational types
and sociocultural frameworks. In the wake of the Aitape tsunami, one
such group was the Combined Churches Organization (cco)—a small,
ephemeral conglomeration of Christian organizations that provided a dis-
tinctive form of relief aid, informed by the local Melanesian culture and
the Christian faith of its workers.
In this paper, we aim to highlight the paucity of scholarly research
exploring the relationships between Christianity and disaster relief in the
Pacific. This task is set in the context of the relationships between Chris-
tianity, aid, and development more broadly, which is a limited but grow-
ing field. In seeking to address this gap, we provide a case study from
Melanesia focusing on the Combined Churches Organization and its
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response to the 1998 Aitape tsunami disaster.1 We position the work of
this organization in the context of local, governmental, and nongovern-
mental responses to the disaster, paying particular attention to the involve-
ment of the Christian Brethren Churches of Papua New Guinea (cbc).2
While addressing the perspectives and motivations of the cco workers—
thereby moving beyond a focus on merely how relief work is carried
out—we also highlight the differing perspectives of the disaster victims
and other relief actors in relation to the tsunami and to the relief that was
provided. Importantly, we consider the implications of this case study for
the practice of effective disaster relief in the Pacific and offer conclusions
that seek to create a space for further research in this increasingly impor-
tant area.
Given the above, the specific objectives of this paper are (1) to analyze
the role of religion in aid and disaster relief in this particular case; (2) to
assess the factors promoting the role played by the Combined Churches
Organization in the Aitape tsunami disaster; (3) to analyze how the orga-
nization went about its work and how religion and local culture informed
this work; (4) to discuss what motivated the pastors’ cco involvement
and to what extent this reflected their underlying belief structures regard-
ing the cause of the disaster; and (5) to relate all of the above to the
broader question of the role of religion in aid and development and to pro-
vide signposts for future research in the region and beyond. 
Christianity, Aid, and Development 
As development studies—and, to a lesser extent, the international devel-
opment sector—shift their focus toward participatory methodologies,
issues concerning the formation of local identities and differentiated epis-
temologies come to the fore. Axes of identity including class, ethnicity, and
gender have increasingly been addressed in both academic and policy set-
tings. Notably, however, religion—as a significant axis of identity—has
received very little attention in such endeavors. Indeed, a report by the
recently formed World Faiths Development Dialogue (wfdd) states that
“we hope to start a debate about the ways in which culture and spiritu-
ality can be taken into account in development processes” (2001, 2;
emphasis added). This is not to say that voices in specifically religious
contexts have been absent from discussion of socioeconomic or cultural
issues, but rather that these voices have in general been overlooked by the
wider development industry, which continues to regard religion as a
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peripheral factor in development processes (wfdd 2000). There has also
been a corresponding lack of development research that places religion
at the center of analysis. Consequently, development practitioners have
exhibited little comprehension of the issues involved.3
The dearth of attention given to religion and development is troubling
for a number of reasons. Of primary concern is the fact that religion is fun-
damentally important—culturally, socially, politically, and economically—
to many in the “majority world,”4 and that issues of religion are there-
fore often vital to the way development is perceived and enacted. Second,
as Terje Tvedt has pointed out, the current boom in nongovernmental
organizations can be traced back to a “missionary phase” of Christian
individuals and organization, stretching from 1860 to the 1960s (1998,
44). Many contemporary development projects have their origins in the
desire of these people to propagate the Christian faith by building and
funding a number of aid and development initiatives, including hospitals,
schools, and other formal and informal activities.5 Reoderick Stirrat and
Heiko Henkel have speculated that today’s ngo movement continues to
share close similarities with Europe’s nineteenth-century missionary
movement—their “doing good to others” remains virtually unquestioned
(1997).
The lack of connection drawn between religious roots and contempo-
rary aid and development realities can be attributed in part to the funda-
mentally secular and materialist nature of the mainstream development
industry. This dominant feature of development theory and practice over
the last fifty years has remained largely unrecognized despite numerous
recent critiques of development discourses and characteristics by post-
developmentalists and others (eg, Esteva 1992; Escobar 1995). Gilbert Rist
has even suggested that development constitutes a modern secular global
faith, with the rhetoric of development’s proponents sharing a number of
significant parallels with American evangelistic arguments for religious
faiths that promise salvation (1997, 77).
Lately, a number of publications indicate that the religion-and-devel-
opment debate is starting to open up. In the field of development studies,
two areas have been at the forefront: First, the role of Christian churches
in African development has received attention from academics (see, eg,
Tsele 1997; Meyer 1998; Kamaara 2000; Phiri 2000) and even from the
World Bank (Belshaw and others 2001). Second, liberation theology—
particularly within Latin and South American contexts (Gutierrez 1972;
1984; Boff and Boff 1987; Berryman 1987; Nickoloff 1993; Beyer 1994;
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Bedford 1999; and Allen 2000)—is one of the few religious movements to
which social scientists have paid significant attention (Lynch 1991). Kathy
Nadeau’s recent study of a Basic Ecclesial Community in the Philippines is
evidence of the continuing relevance of liberation theology beyond Latin
American contexts (1999).
We suggest that one facilitating factor (more in terms of reception than
of authorship) in the publication of this material has come as a result of
the so-called “postmodern turn” in the social sciences, which revives a
sense of openness to the mysterious and the spiritual, challenges the (sec-
ular) hegemony of modernity, and celebrates alternative perspectives from
the majority world that transcend Eurocentric knowledge constructions.
This fledgling attention to religion’s connections to aid and development
raises the question: Can we discern a “religious turn” taking place in cur-
rent development research and practice? We argue that such a turn should
be encouraged in order to better interpret and understand development
processes and practice.
Development and Disaster Relief
Although studies of disasters and disaster relief are always, necessarily,
thoroughly interdisciplinary (Kent 1987; Carter 1991, 338), in this paper
we situate disaster relief within the broader field of development studies.
The close link between the two was initially drawn only in the 1980s
(Cuny 1983, 11), but it is now widely recognized in disaster relief litera-
ture (see, eg, Mancino and others 2001). The key connection that we stress
here is that humanitarian organizations—governmental and nongovern-
mental—tend to be involved in both development and disaster relief work
as they perceive the need.6 Therefore, continuity exists in the organiza-
tions involved, and more importantly, in the vocation ascribed to these
organizations.
Christianity, Aid, and Development in the Pacific
Whether or not an incipient “religious turn” is taking place in development
in the international arena, the Pacific has been relatively devoid of such
analyses. For much of the past century, very few studies focused explic-
itly on the ideological role of Christianity in the Pacific and its impacts on
models or conceptions of “development” or “progress.” Academics have
preferred to focus on either western missionaries or “exotic” cultural
movements such as so-called “cargo cults” (see Barker 1990; 1992).
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Although Pacific experiences of Christianity are still on the margins of
contemporary research, Bronwen Douglas recently noted that more atten-
tion is being given to this subject matter (2001).7 (See also Forman 1994
and Barker 2001a.)
The marginality of Christianity in development studies in the Pacific is
remarkable, given the wide recognition of the role that churches play in
this arena. For instance, Anne Dickson-Waiko has argued, “It should not
be forgotten that, in Papua New Guinea, it was the churches who in the
1880s introduced education, provided health services, taught new skills
and crafts, and brought new goods into communities, roles and activities
which are now organized by a variety of government, and aid and devel-
opment agencies. . . . Many [churches] have built up expertise and expe-
rience in developing and implementing projects, some of which are more
successful than government-run projects” (Waiko 1999, 45).
A number of other studies have also pointed toward the significant role
of churches in the Pacific. Manfred Ernst’s 1994 analysis of new religious
groups includes discussion of the socioeconomic roles of these organiza-
tions, and Alison Dundon has explored the intimate connection between
missions and missionaries, and notions of development among the Gogo-
dala in Papua New Guinea (2002). (See also Douglas 2002; Gewertz and
Errington 1998; and Schep 1996).
A few works have dealt explicitly with the connections between Chris-
tianity and disaster relief. Anthony J W Taylor outlined how the devasta-
tion caused by a hurricane in the Cook Islands was seen by a number of
local clergy as a “punishment from God” (1999).8 Taylor suggested that
this perspective was detrimental to the psychological health of the already
suffering victims. He concluded that the clergy should be encouraged to
change their religious beliefs to a faith more conducive to their future
health.
In Melanesia, only a few studies have addressed the role of Christian
churches in disaster relief.9 One such work is Caspar G To Waninara’s
analysis of the effects of the 1994 Rabaul eruptions on the Tolai people
(1998). To Waninara suggested that of the “three pillars” that upheld Tolai
identity—government, tradition, and Christianity—only Christianity con-
tinued to play a role in the realization of identity throughout the disaster
event and relief process. His analysis pointed toward the overwhelmingly
important and influential role played by churches, especially the Roman
Catholic Church, in delivering aid and support to the victims of the dis-
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aster.10 The lack of studies of Christian groups’ efforts in the specific con-
text of disaster relief thus represents a significant gap in development
studies of the region.11
The Aitape Tsunami and Disaster Relief Responses 
The 1998 Aitape Tsunami
The 1998 Aitape tsunami was one of Papua New Guinea’s worst-ever dis-
asters (Phillips 1998); globally, in number of lives lost, it was the second
most destructive tsunami of the twentieth century (Kawata and others
1999, 101). According to official, provincial government reports, as a
direct result of the disaster 2,156 people died, many of them young chil-
dren or elders (Toyaremwa 1998a). Thousands suffered severe physical or
psychological injuries, or both, and many lost their homes and posses-
sions. Approximately 10,000 people were displaced by the disaster. They
were forced to permanently relocate to sites, generally near or amidst their
village gardens, where new villages were to be built. In addition, the tsu-
nami destroyed or severely damaged five schools, a government post, a
number of health centers, some churches, and a Summer Institute of Lin-
guistics translation center. 
Collectively, the area most devastated by the tsunami, a stretch of coast
about 50 kilometers in length running west from the settlement of Aitape,
has come to be known as ples bagarap (devastated area). Aitape is located
on the north coast of the island of New Guinea, approximately 250 kilo-
meters from the Indonesian (West Papua) border. The four groups worst
affected by the disaster were the Sissano, Warapu, Arop, and Malol peo-
ples. Their villages were located directly on the coast, 25 kilometers west
of Aitape, around Sissano Lagoon, where marine resources were readily
accessible. The waves were most focused and destructive around this
lagoon. Those who lived on the spit between the lagoon and the open sea
faced the worst situation, as not only were the waves most powerful there
but the people had no escape route. As their economy was largely subsis-
tence based, the extensive gardens belonging to these groups were located
inland where fresh water and more fertile soils could be found. 
The people of ples bagarap are predominantly Roman Catholic, with
the church having been established in the area for over a century. Tumleo
Island, just off the coast of Aitape, was the site of the first Roman Catho-
lic mission to the German colony of New Guinea; the mission station was
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initiated in 1896 (Kaima and Nekitel 2000, 11). However, over the last
twenty to thirty years, a number of other denominations have also estab-
lished a presence in the area.
According to Bernard Choulai, the area was entirely unprepared for
such a disaster: “The tsunami could not have found a more unprepared
and structurally weak area to strike. The province is one of the least devel-
oped in Papua New Guinea, with few roads, poor communication links,
little industry, and a virtually non-existent government administration”
(Choulai 1999, 4). In fact, it was not until two days after the disaster first
struck that a disaster relief operation was properly initiated and began to
receive funding and supplies. In the weeks following the disaster, Aitape
town experienced a flood of disaster relief and government workers seek-
ing to participate in the relief operation.
During this period, care centers were set up. These designated sites
operated as relief delivery nodes. The affected population was encouraged
to settle temporarily, with their people, at these sites where tents were set
up for them, and where both government personnel and ngo workers pro-
vided medication, food, and water. The Care Centers continued to operate
until the locations for new villages were negotiated and designated—a
process fraught with tension (see Kalinau and Smanki 1998)—and new
homes were constructed from bush materials. In the new villages, the peo-
ple primarily built their own houses, although the construction of perma-
nent buildings—community schools, aid posts, and so on—was carried
out with the help of outside resources.
Overall, it is estimated that major nongovernmental organizations alone
raised about twenty million kina for disaster relief (Nelson 1999).12 This
figure would certainly be greater if government sources and other ngo
funds were taken into account, but due to the complexity and diversity of
relief providers it is impossible to calculate an exact total. The provision
of emergency relief continued for several months, but long-term aid was
still being delivered three years after the disaster. Although some donations
were provided through PNG sources, most came from international
donors (Nelson 1999, 250).
The process of relief provision was imbued with tension and conflict
(Toyaremwa 1998b). Many of the victims of the disaster expressed frus-
tration about what they felt was an unequal distribution of resources,
accusing some donors of favoring particular groups over others. Groups
from ples bagarap frequently aimed charges of corruption and favoritism
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at the major and most visible donors: the Roman Catholic diocese and the
PNG government. A sense of competition and skelim (measuring) between
the different groups affected by the disaster persisted throughout the
period of aid delivery. In both interviews and also informal discussions,
both the providers and recipients of aid expressed deep dissatisfaction
with the relief process.
The Failure of Local and National Government Relief Channels
A central feature of the 1998 Aitape disaster was the limited, confused,
and ambiguous role played by the central and local governments in the
relief process (Swan 1999). Since independence, PNG governmental struc-
ture has strongly emphasized devolution and decentralization of author-
ity. This was first enshrined in Michael Somare’s “Eight Aims,” outlined
in 1973 (see King and others 1985). It was further reinforced by the 1994
Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments.
With respect to disaster relief, the Disaster Management Act of 1986 like-
wise designated that local and provincial governments should play a pri-
mary role in managing disaster relief operations (Kaitilla and Yambui
1996, 62; Choulai 1999, 9). However, the process of decentralization has
only ever been partially implemented, and in the case of the 1998 Aitape
tsunami disaster relief, neither the local nor provincial governments were
in any position to be meaningfully involved, let alone coordinating the
process. Both these levels of government were in severe disarray.
Choulai has stated, bluntly, that the local Aitape government “did not
participate in the relief efforts because it did not exist during the disaster”
(1999, 9). The Court of Disputed Returns had declared the 1997 Aitape-
Lumi local government elections invalid in early 1998, and as a result no
local government political representation was operational at the time of
the disaster. 
The Sandaun provincial government was at least functioning at the
time, but it too faced serious problems, lacking a provincial administrator.
Choulai pointed out that the previous administrator had been “suspended
in January 1998, and the position was then occupied by a ‘caretaker’ who
had virtually no power and couldn’t direct civil servants or organize fund-
ing” (1999, 9). The position was only filled in February 1999. So, for the
first six months of the relief operation, no individual was able to provide
significant leadership at the provincial level. Another major limiting factor
for the provincial government was highlighted in a United Nations Disas-
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ter Assessment and Coordination report, which stated that “the province
appears to be inadequately funded, even by Papua New Guinea standards,
so that its capacity to respond is limited by a shortage of resources as well
as poor or inadequate roads and communications” (undac 1999, 14).
Indeed, at the time of the disaster no roads linked Vanimo (the provincial
capital) and much of the rest of the province (Kuok and others 1998, 6).
A final nail in the coffin was the Sandaun provincial government’s past
record of misusing finances in the past, through both gross incompetence
and corruption (Geno 1987; Boyce 1992, 79–83). This reputation did not
give international donors the confidence to channel relief funds through
what might otherwise have been considered the “appropriate” official
structures.
Although the provincial government did seek to participate in the dis-
aster relief process through forming a Provincial Disaster Committee, its
role was marginal and largely ineffective. In fact, after a few months the
committee ceased to function, as a result of its complete lack of recognized
authority and the absence of significant resources.
Soon after the terrible consequences of the disaster became apparent,
then Prime Minister Bill Skate declared the affected area to be in a state
of emergency. National Police Commissioner Peter Aigilo was appointed
controller and given extensive authority over the area, further shifting
power away from the provincial and local governments to the national
level. Though legislation dictated that a state of emergency should only
be a temporary measure, it was not actually removed until three months
into the disaster relief process. During these three months the position of
controller was shuffled between three separate individuals, resulting in
fragmented and discontinuous leadership. The national government,
through the National Disaster Emergency Service, also set up a coordinat-
ing committee called the Aitape District Disaster Committee. This com-
mittee vied for a coordinating role with various governmental and other
organizations.
Importantly, in 1998 PNG government funds were at an all-time low.
Over the previous decade the country’s economy had deteriorated to such
an extent that at the time of the disaster all economic reports were “full of
criticism and despair” (Cox 1999, 6).13 Of particular interest is that just
prior to the Aitape disaster the National Disaster Emergency Service had
lost a large proportion of its staff due to budget cuts. The government
simply did not have the resources to participate fully in an effective relief
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operation without international economic support (Phillips 1998). That
financial support however, was not forthcoming. The national govern-
ment, under the leadership of consecutive prime ministers but especially
Bill Skate, had been severely discredited and was widely recognized as “the
most corrupt and incompetent government since independence” (Cox
1999, 10).14 This reputation certainly did not improve during the disaster
relief process as accusations of government corruption continued (Nelson
1999, 259). As a result of all these factors, the role the government played
during the disaster relief process was very limited.
The Roman Catholic Diocese
The void left by the government’s weak coordination of the relief process
was largely filled by the local Roman Catholic diocese, which assumed a
major, influential role. It became the major disaster relief organization
involved in the relief process, with the Aitape Catholic Diocese Relief
Committee even carrying out work that was traditionally reserved solely
for governmental authorities, including funding the construction of basic
infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, to enable relief delivery. The
diocesan committee was able to assume such a prominent role primarily
because it became the lead organization to receive and channel funds
donated by the national and international community. Donors who
refused to contribute funds to national and provincial governments found
an alternative channel through the diocese. As a result of this access to
finances, the diocesan committee constructed most of the community
schools for the new villages, implemented a thorough counseling program,
built a number of nursing homes, and carried out numerous other relief
activities. 
Significantly, however, although the government was not in a position
to coordinate the relief process, it did not relinquish its perceived right to
do so. As a result, three main committees—the Provincial Disaster Com-
mittee, the Aitape District Disaster Committee, and the Aitape Catholic
Diocese Relief Committee—contended to play the lead role in relief man-
agement. According to Edward Kiza’s report to care Australia: “All three
committees have been trying to manage the rescue and evacuation, relief
phases of the management of the tsunami disaster of course with the con-
troller in command. All three players have been planning for recovery pro-
grams in isolation of each other” (1999, 8). This situation led to consid-
erable overlap, competition, and confusion in relief delivery.
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The Role of the Combined Churches Organization
The Combined Churches Organization also sought to conduct relief work
following the 1998 Aitape tsunami disaster. Unlike the Roman Catholic
diocese, the role of this organization was much more limited, and through-
out its operations it remained on the margins of the mainstream aid and
development industry. Because it existed and worked outside of the dis-
courses employed by the dominant, secular, western aid and development
actors, it provides a useful and fascinating case study through which issues
of religion, aid, and development in the Pacific can be explored. This sec-
tion highlights the form this unique organization took and explores the
relief activities it carried out at ples bagarap.
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact date on which the Combined
Churches Organization was formed. This is in large part because of the
diffuse and fragmented nature of authority within the organization, which
has resulted in the lack of a singular official or orthodox perspective. One
individual who was heavily involved in its inception in Wewak suggested
that an organization bearing the same name—the Combined Churches
Organization—was “already in existence” in Wewak prior to the Aitape
disaster (Kay Liddle, pers comm, 4 Feb 2002). This “cco” was interde-
nominational—as was the later organization—and it “met occasionally
on an ad hoc basis” to carry out joint activities, such as “youth” church
services or evangelistic meetings. However, in responding to the Aitape
disaster, the Combined Churches Organization took on entirely new pur-
poses, functions, and organizational structures.
Major Features of the CCO Organizational Structure
Conglomeration. The Combined Churches Organization was a con-
glomeration of independent member groups, representing primarily an
evangelical theological position or heritage, although a number of other
denominations and para-church groups were also involved.15 The member
churches tended to be smaller denominations that were already operating
in the Sepik at the time of the disaster. A number of contributing organi-
zations were also involved in a more peripheral way, as informal partners,
generally through the provision of financial resources. 
The cco structure was only ever designed to loosely connect these
autonomous groups together. At points in their disaster-relief work, some
groups operated closely with each other, sharing resources, information,
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and networks. But at other times member groups could operate almost
entirely independently of each other, specializing in a particular project or
channeling resources in specific directions. The autonomy of each member
group was not compromised by cco participation. Some important fea-
tures arise from this weakly structured membership.
First, cco participation—by both component groups and individuals—
was entirely voluntary. No cco participants received salaries. Some of the
pastors who worked with the organization in ples bagarap received a
small food stipend for the duration of the time that they were in the area.
This amount was intended to cover just the costs of daily living. The vol-
untary system built on preexisting denominational networks, including
expatriate missionaries as well as local church pastors and other respected
church leaders. The organization was also nonprofessional, in that none
of the members had training or expertise in disaster relief or develop-
ment.16 The cco ethos in this regard appears to have been to use whatever
resources were at hand to achieve effective relief delivery. The organization
operated largely through informal relationships, with no individual or
group signing a contract. Certainly, no constitution was ever created to
outline how the relief process would be carried out or where responsibil-
ity or authority would lie.
Second, the cco structure was designed to facilitate relief practice
rather than to focus on the organization as such. It emphasized delivering
aid to the ples bagarap in the most effective, efficient, and meaningful
ways possible. The organizational structure did not exist for its own sake
but only in support of this goal. As autonomous groups participated in the
organization primarily to enhance the pragmatics of their own separate
relief delivery, organizational membership fluctuated. A group might
decide that, if a particular task could be undertaken sufficiently without
help from the rest of the conglomeration, why involve the others?
Third, in comparison to the other relief organizations operating during
the Aitape disaster, cco financial resources were very limited. Estimates
of the total amount of money channeled through the Combined Churches
Organization and its component members ranged from 500,000 to
600,000 kina (Andrew Linton, pers comm, 15 Aug 2001; Reggie Howard,
pers comm, 21 Aug 2001). In keeping with the informal nature of the
organization, no official assessment or audit has yet been conducted of
the accounts, to our knowledge. In addition to the official cco relief bank
account, a number of member groups continued to operate their own
relief accounts—a further indication of the weak nature of cco mem-
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bership, the continuing autonomous ethos of component groups, and the
flimsy internal hierarchy. Although it is difficult to be sure, it seems that
the majority of the cco funding came from either transnational denomi-
national links or specifically religious organizations. Its small size enabled
flexibility that larger organizations, more thoroughly engaged with official
aid channels, were unable to pursue.
Fourth and finally, the Combined Churches Organization was, and was
intended to be, short-lived. As an emergent organization, it was formed in
an ad hoc manner in response to the disaster event. Members participated
knowing that their involvement, and the organization itself, would be tem-
porary. The organization’s ephemeral nature resonated with its fluid mem-
bership, as its constituent groups and individuals changed considerably
over time. The activities undertaken by the organization also altered
depending on the needs and desires of the shifting membership.
Multicentered. The Combined Churches Organization was also multi-
centered, that is, it had a number of different centers of authority, decision-
making, and financial control. Each component group, as noted earlier,
tended to have a high degree of independence from the others and often
controlled their own human and financial resources. There were three
quite distinct areas of activity, roughly aligning to three geographical loca-
tions: Wewak, Aitape, and ples bagarap.
The primary cco administrative, managerial, and financial operations
were located in Wewak, in the form of the Combined Churches Organiza-
tion Disaster Relief Committee. This committee—made up mostly of
expatriate missionaries—met sporadically for the first three months after
the disaster. The earliest committee minutes were dated 14 August 1998.
At this meeting Ivan Huasi (from the Seventh-day Adventists) was elected
chair and Kay Liddle (from the Christian Brethren Churches [cbc] and
Christian Books Melanesia) as secretary. David Aiwung (from cbc) was
also appointed as the official cco representative in Aitape. 
The final committee meeting convened on 25 February 1999. The min-
utes from this meeting recorded how the committee was to be disbanded.
A portion of cco funds was to be spent on a number of specified projects
and the remainder would be transferred to the cbc relief account to sup-
port its continuing relief work. However, as these minutes suggest, the
work of the cco Disaster Relief Committee did not simply end; rather, it
was picked up primarily by cbc national office and by Christian Books
Melanesia, both in Wewak.
Aitape acted as an intermediary between Wewak and ples bagarap. The
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key figure involved here was David Aiwung—a local man from near Aitape
and a strong member of the local cbc congregation. David was supported
by a small committee set up by a meeting of the Aitape District cbc lead-
ers (David Aiwung, pers comm, 8 July 2001). This committee was origi-
nally designed to help in cbc relief work but under the leadership of
David Aiwung expanded to fulfill a much larger role in support of the
Combined Churches Organization. The main roles of the Aitape side of
the organization were to channel resources to the affected people; sup-
port cco workers who operated in ples bagarap; provide local knowl-
edge to facilitate relief delivery; liaise on behalf of the cco Disaster Relief
Committee with locals, government officials (David attended meetings of
the Aitape District Disaster Committee), and other nongovernmental
organizations; provide a base in Aitape for cco personnel in transit; and
act as a communication node by reporting information back to Wewak.
However, the history of the Aitape committee is similar to that of the
cco Disaster Relief Committee; although the committee did function for
a few months, most of the its members were unable to maintain extensive
involvement over a longer period of time due to other commitments.
David Aiwung consequently became the only active member of the Aitape
side of the organization. He continued his work for a period of at least
three years and at the time the fieldwork for this paper was undertaken,
he was still active in his role.
The ples bagarap side of the Combined Churches Organization was
almost entirely centered on actual relief delivery. It was founded on a net-
work of Christian pastors who were the key figures in the delivery of var-
ious types and forms of relief. This side is discussed more extensively later
in this article.
Religious. The Combined Churches Organization was fundamentally
religious in nature. The various component groups, contributing members,
and even the donors were all explicitly Christian groups, the majority
having an evangelical heritage. Importantly, religion informed every part
of the organization, as both the organizers and the cco workers expressed
a clear desire for the organization to be seen as Christian. David Aiwung
expressed the following in regard to the reason for the organization:
philip: Why did you not put the [donated] money into the account, the gov-
ernment account?
david: I think donors who donate money, they are not happy with us putting
money into their [government] account, they want us to do the job our-
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selves . . . so you see the donors who come under cco they were Christian
organizations, Christian firms, so they give money to cco, so we coordi-
nate our programs, we do our [own] work. (David Aiwung, pers comm, 13
July 2001)
The Combined Churches Organization was constructed so as to convey
a religious message—it was designed to be a medium of communication.
The telling of this religious message was, according to David Aiwung, the
“main reason” for the organization. What was this message? It was to
“preach salvation in action” or to “preach salvation indirect.” That is,
the message was to be articulated without direct and antagonistic procla-
mation (David Aiwung, pers comm, 8 July 2001). 
Another organizer who also shared a similar perspective was Reggie
Howard, an expatriate missionary based at cbc national office. Reggie sug-
gested that there was a particular cco “philosophy of ministry.” Although
this “wasn’t written down and nobody signed a form and that kind of
thing” it was nevertheless agreed to by cco workers. The philosophy was
centered on a religiously motivated concern with the suffering of the vic-
tims of the disaster. In Reggie’s words:
[W]e need to show concern and love to bring about healing. . . . I don’t know
who first had that idea, whether it was David or myself, it was just the obvi-
ous thing that we needed to show the love of Christ and this was the oppor-
tunity to do it. We need to help people whether they are going to respond or
not, we need to help them. (Reggie Howard, pers comm, 14 Aug 2001)
The emphasis here, as with David, was to express the religious message
in nonconfrontational and sensitive—but nevertheless “audible”—ways.
The message was to be conveyed through both the actual donations given
as well as through the network of pastors who operated in ples bagarap.
Male dominated. Finally, the Combined Churches Organization was
almost entirely dominated by men, with women playing only minor and
peripheral roles in the organization.17 It was men who were primarily
involved as part of the pastor network and within the cco administration.
In this regard, the organization reflected the wider sociocultural environ-
ment, which, as Orovu Sepoe has argued, has tended to exclude women
from all levels of Papua New Guinea’s political system (2000). That is,
although women are involved in political processes in Papua New Guinea,
this involvement rarely takes place in a public, formal, and structured man-
ner. In addition, cco work was regarded as being predominantly “men’s”
work—both in its pastoral emphasis and in the types of physical activities
336 the contemporary pacific • fall 2004
the pastors needed to undertake. Also of concern were various reports,
spread widely throughout the Sepik, about women having been raped in
ples bagarap following the disaster (Toyaremwa 1998b; pers comm, 15
July 2001). As a consequence, women were seen as being particularly vul-
nerable at that time.
Main Types of Relief Activities
The Combined Churches Organization was involved in three sectors of
relief activity: relief aid, reconstruction, and church planting. In all cco
relief work, it sought to fill niche needs and specifically religious goals.
Relief Aid. Prior to the inception of the cco organizational structure,
individuals and organizations that would later become part of the con-
glomerate were already providing relief aid to the victims of the Aitape
disaster. However, over the weeks and months after the disaster a certain
system of relief provision evolved. This more organized system was based
around a network of pastors who were sent to ples bagarap by their
churches for periods stretching from weeks to months and even years. The
pastors were key elements in cco relief efforts. They generally worked in
teams of three or more in each major Care Center or in the new villages.
Although the pastor network as a system ended a few months after the dis-
aster event, a number of pastors continued to be involved in the area for
a much longer period of time.
Importantly, the pastors had a set of regulations that guided their behav-
ior while at ples bagarap. These appear to have been primarily of David
Aiwung’s invention and focus around religious propagation and cultural
and moral appropriateness. The regulations stated that cco workers: 
Must not preach the doctrines of their church.
Must not preach anything against any other church.
Must not attempt to convince anyone that his or her church was best.
Must not force people to go to church or force anyone to pray.
Must not work with ladies, especially alone with ladies. 
Would do things in action, because actions will preach to them the love
of Jesus Christ. (David Aiwung, pers comm, 13 July 2001)
The pastor network was well suited to cco needs. It was flexible, skilled
in the areas of labor required, based on voluntary labor, efficient in the use
of resources, and provided a trustworthy system of goods distribution.
Through living and working alongside locals at ples bagarap, the pastors
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sought to achieve the key cco aim of sharing a religious message. Impor-
tantly, the pastors did not stay in a village or Care Center unless they were
invited to do so. When they did go to a village, they stayed in the home of
locals. In this way the pastor network was dependent on the hospitality of
the local people.
Three main types of relief aid were undertaken by the pastors at ples
bagarap: goods distribution, manual laboring, and pastoral care (David
Aiwung, pers comm, 8 July 2001). The pastors were the key on-the-ground
distributors of the goods and relief aid that the Combined Churches Orga-
nization sought to provide to the affected populace. The stated goal was
to deliver the goods to all who suffered regardless of denominational
alignment or other links (David Aiwung, pers comm, 20 June 2001; Reg-
gie Howard, pers comm, 14 Aug 2001). The goods distributed primarily
consisted of practical items for everyday usage, or what David Aiwung
called “basic needs” (pers comm, 20 June 2001). Kay Liddle, in a letter to
a donor dated 5 November 1998, discussed how some of the many items
had been distributed. Besides clothing for men, women, and children,
these “basics” included plastic water containers, saucepans, axes, bush
knives, spades, sago strainers, Bibles and New Testaments in Tok Pisin and
English, tracts, guitars, tambourines, volleyballs and nets, and soccer balls.
These items tended to be relatively inexpensive, and the choice of goods
shows a good understanding of what materials were required in the local
area, as well as niche needs left out by larger donor organizations. Both
features indicate a strong communication system between the ples bagarap
and Wewak, where the goods were purchased.
The manual laboring aspect of the pastors’ work took up the majority
of their time. The pastors worked alongside the locals in whatever activ-
ities were being undertaken, including building houses, planting gardens,
and so on. In addition, the pastors were active in constructing new, tem-
porary, bush-material schools for the children. These activities involved
heavy manual labor as well as close communication and interaction with
the disaster victims. 
Pastoral care was designed to meet the perceived spiritual and emo-
tional needs of those affected by the disaster. This involved a mix of per-
sonal interaction (including prayer, encouragement, support, and Bible
studies) between the cco pastors and the disaster victims as well as the
distribution of items such as Bibles and other religious tracts.
Reconstruction. The reconstruction stage centered on the creation of
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permanent buildings for Wauroiyn Community School and the Pou Aid
Post. The shift in activities from relief aid to reconstruction also signaled
a change for the cco organization. The “combined” aspect of the Com-
bined Churches Organization ceased to be fully operative when many of
the component organizations pulled out at the end of the relief-aid phase.
It was also at the changeover from relief aid to reconstruction that the
pastor network ceased to function.
Liebenzell Mission International was the key organization and primary
funding source involved in the construction of the Pou Aid Post. The con-
struction of Wauroiyn Community School was initiated by the Papua New
Guinea Evangelical Alliance and tear (The Evangelical Alliance Relief
fund) Australia, but the Christian Brethren Churches carried out the
majority of the organizational work in Papua New Guinea, and David
Aiwung was extensively involved in managing the process. Christian Books
Melanesia also helped provide finances for small school items. Pou and
Wauroiyn received major cco building projects because they did not
receive such assistance from any other group. The reasons for this are com-
plicated and could be debated. The key point here is that the Combined
Churches Organization filled niche needs in its reconstruction work as it
did in other aspects of relief aid. 
Church Planting. The final sector of cco relief activity was what can be
termed “church planting.” Church planting was a “relief” activity because
it was in direct continuity with, and extensively overlapped with, the other
relief activities. Importantly, the work of church planting was not con-
sidered peripheral or an add-on to the core cco relief work but an essen-
tial part of the organization’s disaster relief activities. 
There were six types of evangelistic activity undertaken by cco work-
ers: distributing relief aid; giving away tracts and Bibles; autim tok
(preaching); praying; forming a Sunday School; and showing the Jesus
Film.18 In addition, a number of evangelistic conventions were held by
church groups in the area. Although these were not under the cco banner,
they were nevertheless closely connected with the rest of the cco work.
Although prior to the tsunami disaster there were no cbc congrega-
tions in the area, following the disaster three new cbc churches were set
up in ples bagarap. In addition, some other denominations (including
South Seas Evangelical Church, Evangelical Brotherhood Church, and
Assemblies of God) involved in the Combined Churches Organization also
set up churches. These churches were formed in consultation with the
local people, and although they sometimes received resistance from the
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wider (predominantly Roman Catholic) community, they also existed
solely at the discretion of the local communities.
Perspectives and Motivations of 
Pastors and Other Actors 
Differing Perspectives of the Cause of the Disaster
In responding to a disaster, a key factor influencing behavior and practice
is one’s perspective on the cause of the disaster—how and why it took
place. Garry Trompf has argued that, along with moments of salvation,
disaster events constitute the most significant events in every society,
because they demand explanation and understanding (1994, 131). Here
we wish to discuss briefly three main perspectives on the cause of the
Aitape disaster. It is important to understand the nature of these compet-
ing explanations, as they conditioned the responses and actions of vari-
ously positioned groups in the context of the disaster and led to consid-
erable conflict between donors and others, which will be discussed later
in more detail.
The first perspective was that of the “observers.” This was the dominant
understanding among the relief organizations, although it was also shared
by a number of local people. It was most clearly articulated by western
and Japanese academics who helped investigate this hazard “more thor-
oughly than any previous tsunami worldwide” (Davies 2000, 1). The key
question asked by the scientists appears to have been, What “natural”
phenomena caused the tsunami? (see, eg, Kawata and others 1999). This
question was based on an assumption that the tsunami was a “natural dis-
aster” with no underlying “intentionality.” Although debated, the answer
to this question that became the accepted orthodoxy was that the wave
was caused by an underwater “slump,” triggered in turn by an earthquake
measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale. The slump displaced a large volume of
water, causing a “pocket tsunami” (Smith 2000)—enormous in strength
but limited in range (Tappin and others 1999). The waves were channeled
toward Sissano Lagoon by an underwater trench. This explanation relied
on hypothesis testing and scientific collection of data, and the proofs pro-
vided were both textual (scientific journals, brochures) and pictorial (maps
of the ocean flood, underwater photographs, diagrams, charts) (see, eg,
Kawata and others 1999; upng Division of Geosciences 2001). This per-
spective was the most publicized and also was the most widely held within
the western contexts associated with disaster relief.
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A second perspective on the disaster was that of the “victims.”19 For
many of those severely affected by the disaster, regardless of denomina-
tional adherence, explaining the disaster was more a question of “who”
than “what.” Responses in interviews primarily with Arop Two villagers
identified the cause of the tsunami as a bomb that had been planted by for-
eigners. Those who held this view had almost always heard the scientific
(observers’) perspective through open-air meetings or pamphlets in Tok
Pisin and English, but they rejected it because of alternative, experiential
evidence, which they felt the scientific view could not explain. Eddie, a
prominent member of Arop Two village, noted, for example: reports of
strange sightings of “unidentified objects” and submarines in the imme-
diate months before and after the hazard event; a belief that the wounds
inflicted by the tsunami—including burns and cuts that did not bleed—
were unnatural; a perception that the waves were particularly devastating
in the more densely populated areas; and rumors of oil or precious jewel
deposits located in the area, which might have somehow motivated the
perpetrators of the disaster (pers comm, 25 June 2001).
The differing perspectives were a cause of tension between the aid
donors (observers) and the aid recipients (victims). The donors tended to
see the aid being provided as an altruistic gift for those who were victims
of the disaster. Most of this aid was short-term and controlled by the
donor organization. Implicit in the donor efforts was the assumption that
the affected people would “receive” the aid rather than actively participate
in its distribution and allocation. This type and process of aid delivery was
entirely in line with a view of the disaster as a freak “accident of nature.”
But the victims’ perspective led to quite a different interpretation of the
relief aid provided. As the disaster was thought to have been intentional,
the aid was seen as compensation rather than as an altruistic gift. Bernard
Choulai’s description of how locals called the aid “blood money” supports
this understanding (1999, 20). This perspective significantly informed the
victims’ expectations about how the relief should be allocated and distrib-
uted, because compensation claims are normally negotiated in terms of
what would be appropriate for each individual or group. The process of
giving and receiving compensation is an intensely political activity involv-
ing public negotiation, participation, measuring, and debate.20 Thus, the
process of disaster-relief provision as informed by the observers’ perspec-
tive of the tsunami was distinctly at odds with the local victims’ cultural
understandings.
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The Perspectives of the CCO Pastors
In contrast to the perspectives of both observers and victims, those of the
cbc pastors who worked in ples bagarap with the Combined Churches
Organization sought to consider how the divine had been involved in the
disaster event. Their understandings then informed the process and forms
of disaster relief in which they were engaged.21
The dominant perspective of the cco pastors was that God had caused
the tsunami to punish Roman Catholics for their lack of Christian faith.
Importantly, Roman Catholics were seen as occupying a compromised or
nominal Christian space because their actions were not considered to be
those of model Christians. The people of ples bagarap were widely reputed
to have been strongly anti-Christian and to have pursued pasin nogut
(wrong behavior). The view that the tsunami was a divine punishment
therefore involved dual attribution of the disaster to God and to the peo-
ple of the devastated area. God had only caused the disaster because the
people themselves had disobeyed God or had sinned—their behavior pro-
voked God’s response.
The following extract from an interview with James Nonwo, a cbc pas-
tor from Lumi, helps illuminate this perspective:
philip: Why did you want to help? What is your reason for wanting to help?
nonwo: Ok, narapela tingting, as tingting, bikos ol i no save long tok bilong
Bikpela. Ol i no save long Bikpela. Olsem mipela go helpim ol long dispela
sait in order to bringim gutnuis long ol, touchim ol long tok bilong Bikpela.
Em, dispela em as tingting. So taim ol i tanim bel na kam long Bikpela bai
sindaun bilong ol i kamap gutpela. God bai blesim ol na sindaun bilong ol
bai kamap gutpela. Na taim ol i no save long God ol bai mekim kain kain
pasin olsem na mipela tingting disaster i kamap long dispela as. Taim ol i no
bilip long Bikpela olsem . . . sin na suffering na destruction i kamap. Taim
man, ol laip bilong ol man i gutpela, bai i nogat sampela rong i kamap. Em
olsem tingting mipela gat long olsem. So em as tingting bilong mipela
helpim ol so mipela ken kisim gospel na go long helpim ol na ol i ken tanim
bel na kam bilong Bikpela, kisim bikpela lait na laip b’long ol i stap gut.
(pers comm, 5 Aug 2001)
(Ok, another thought, a deep [real] thought, because they don’t know about
God. They do not know God. So we went and helped them on this side in
order to bring the good news to them, touch them with the Word of God
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[to make the Word of God meaningful to them]. This is the real reasoning.
So when they repent and come to God their behavior [way of life] will
become good. God will bless them and they become good. And when they
did not know God they did inconsistent [different, various] things and we
think this disaster happened because of this. When they do not believe in
God . . . and they sin, they receive suffering and destruction. We think this
is the reason for the disaster. When men [people] all their lives are good,
nothing bad will happen. This is our thinking on this matter. So that is our
deep [real] thinking. So the reason we helped them is that we can get the
gospel and go and help them and then they can repent and come to the
Lord, get the big light and their life will be good. [Authors’ translation])
James clearly articulated the way he perceived God as being intimately
involved in the disaster event. His purpose in going to ples bagarap was to
bring “good news” to the affected populace so that they would convert
to Christianity. Once this happened they would be at peace with God and
they would not be adversely affected by such calamities as the Aitape tsu-
nami in the future. James Nonwo saw his disaster relief work as simulta-
neously a process of responding to the past disaster as well as assisting in
the prevention of future destruction.
This perspective—that the spiritual /divine punishes humans who trans-
gress moral codes—is not without precedent in the area. In the 1980s,
Paschal Yolwo Waisi conducted ethnographic fieldwork on the myths and
worldview of the Olo-speaking Lau’um people, residing in the coastal and
near coastal regions of Aitape district (2000). One story he recorded par-
ticularly resonates with Fountain’s research: Many years ago there was a
great earthquake followed by a mighty flood and many were drowned in
the water. At that time people interpreted it as divine punishment, and the
story was retold to others as “a moral guide for individuals to behave
according to their norms such as showing respect for one another, and not
to be involved in sex outside of marriage as some such disaster may occur
again as a punishment handed out to human beings for their wrong doings
by some spiritual entities” (Waisi 2000, 23–24). This connection suggests
that the pastors’ perspectives were informed by a Melanesian sense of rec-
iprocity or payback (see Trompf 1994). This does not indicate that the pas-
tors were not evangelical, but rather that they had a Melanesian evangel-
ical theology.
In the framework of this Melanesian evangelical theology, it is under-
standable therefore that the pastors held a holistic perspective: that both
physical and spiritual needs required attention. Although the pastors did
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not see the spiritual and the physical as necessarily being one and the same
thing, they saw extensive overlap and interaction between them. For exam-
ple, their concern to evangelize the people of ples bagarap was informed
by concern for both spiritual and physical realities: while “saving souls”
the pastors also perceived themselves as undertaking a type of disaster-
mitigation program—ensuring that future disasters would not take place
by encouraging the people to conform to a way of life that was in proper
relationship with the spiritual or divine.
Most of those interviewed who were involved in this way were pastors
from cbc congregations. Many had received pastoral training at cbc
Bible schools and were involved in Christian ministry with local churches.
Most came from the Sepik area. The spiritual focus of the pastors was
not simply put to one side when they became involved in the Combined
Churches Organization. Indeed, in many ways their goals—of ministry
and evangelism—altered very little as a result of their disaster relief work.
What did change were the ways in which they sought to fulfill those goals
and the location and people with whom they sought to fulfill them.
Implications for Aid and Development 
Practice and Study 
This case study is offered in an attempt to fill the gap left by the current
paucity of research into religion and development in the Pacific. We have
shown through discussion and analysis of the Combined Churches Orga-
nization that religion is a crucial axis of identity and does inform attitudes
and behavior in aid and development situations. 
The perspectives of the cco pastors shared similarities and differences
with other groups involved in the Aitape disaster relief. The pastors’ views
were at points closely aligned with the victims of the disaster—such as in
the emphasis on reciprocity, the belief in the intentionality of the disaster,
and the focus on grassroots and flexible responses to the calamity. How-
ever, these two groups differed significantly in the role they ascribed to the
divine and in their expectations of how the victims should respond to the
tragedy.
Likewise, a comparison between the local-level relief aid, reconstruc-
tion, and pastoral care provided by the Combined Churches Organization
and more massively funded, larger-scale infrastructural, construction, and
other projects coordinated by the Roman Catholic diocese—both groups
explicitly Christian and largely of local Melanesian membership—high-
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lights a wide divergence in practice and perspectives in disaster relief. It
cannot therefore be a matter of assigning generalized signifiers and assum-
ing unproblematic continuity with other similarly labeled groups. Greater
attention to specificities and context is necessary. 
The Combined Churches Organization is unlikely to be the only emer-
gent or religious organization to participate in disaster relief in the future.
Other religious organizations, which in some ways will be similar to the
Combined Churches Organization, will continue to participate in disaster
relief situations in the Pacific. This is particularly the case in the context of
the poorer countries in Melanesia where political instability is currently
endemic. The formal mechanisms of disaster relief through government
systems are generally in weak or ineffective positions, thus opening up
possibilities for organizations such as the Combined Churches Organiza-
tion to carry out their own kind of relief work. Indeed this mirrors the
increasing importance of nonformal political entities the world over, as
nation-states become either too small to handle globalization or too large
to satisfy their increasingly diverse electorates and their rising or changing
expectations. International donors must recognize and work with such
organizations.
To work with religious groups in the Pacific donors must have more
than a cursory understanding of what motivates and informs their work.
It is imperative that further research on such groups be undertaken and the
results shared with donor groups. It is also essential that donors realize
that their perspectives—although seemingly widespread—are not neces-
sarily shared by those with whom they seek to work. Local organizations
may operate according to entirely different sets of values and purposes.
Likewise, local populations may have vastly different expectations and
perceive the aid in entirely different ways. Understanding that these differ-
ing discourses are present in aid and development situations will enhance
a donor’s ability to successfully negotiate these complex sociopolitical
contexts.
We suggest that numerous potentially fruitful avenues of research exist
in this critical area. Apart from encouraging more work on disaster relief
activities in the Pacific and the role of religious institutions generally, we
suggest special focus on the rise of nongovernmental disaster response in
the wake of political instability and the particular role of churches in this
respect; the role of belief structures in conditioning responses to disasters;
the ephemeral nature of such organizations; and the grassroots political
economy of disaster relief, with attention to the power relations inherent
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in the activities of churches in this context. This latter point is key, for as
we hope we have illustrated, the interaction between religion and disaster
relief is intensely political at all levels, and the complexity of such power
relations needs to be woven into subsequent analyses if practice is to
become more locally and culturally appropriate.
* * *
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Notes
1 The paper is based on the fieldwork of Philip M Fountain, who spent three
months in the Sepik region of Papua New Guinea, June–August 2001. During
this time, he undertook qualitative ethnographic research involving more than
sixty interviews with various individuals or groups involved in the Aitape disas-
ter relief operation and in the Combined Churches Organization. See Fountain
2002.
2 The Christian Brethren Churches of Papua New Guinea are aligned with the
evangelical Open or Christian Brethren movement. For general descriptions and
histories of the global movement, see Rowdon 1967; Coad 1976, 1991a, 1991b;
and McLaren 1991. The cbc publishing arm, Christian Books Melanesia (cbm),
is also addressed in this article, as it, too, was extensively involved in the cco
disaster relief operations.
3 This is especially the case in the study of disasters and disaster relief, where
scholars have failed to pay systematic attention to the cultural—let alone the reli-
gious (see Webb and Eyre 2000).
4 In this paper, we use the term “majority world” rather than alternative
terms, such as the “third world” or the “developing world,” which we deem to
carry belittling connotations.
5 See also Luna 2001 regarding the religious origin of nongovernmental dis-
aster-relief organizations in the Philippines.
6 For a more thorough discussion of the linkages between development and
disaster relief, see Fountain 2002, 30–34.
7 Douglas’s perceptive analysis and thorough coverage of the anthropological,
ethnographic literature of Christianity in Melanesia, as well as the comments and
responses her article spurred from many leading academics in the field, are valu-
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able contributions to this area of study. However, as John Barker noted in his
response to Douglas’s paper, there are still extraordinarily few explorations of this
topic from academics outside of anthropology (2001b, 632).
8 For further analyses that address the “punishment from God” response to
adverse situations, see Wakefield 2001, 38, and Stewart and Strathern 2001, 97.
9 See also Ballard 2000 for a short discussion of the role of Christian mis-
sions in disaster relief in Irian Jaya (West Papua) during the 1997–1998 drought,
and Waddell 1983 for another brief consideration of the role of mission groups
in the 1972 drought in the highlands of Papua New Guinea.
10 In regard to “complex humanitarian emergencies,” Bobbi Kusilifu has
highlighted the role of Christian churches in the Solomon Islands conflict (2002),
and John Garrett has discussed the social and religious context of the 1987 Fijian
coups (1990).
11 For a useful comparison with this paper, see Hanna Schmuck’s analysis of
Islamic explanations for floods in Bangladesh (2000).
12 The approximate exchange rate for the period November 1998–January
1999 was 0.47 kina to one US dollar.
13 These economic woes were in part due to the 1997–1998 Asian economic
crisis; the 1997 drought, which had limited mining operations in Ok Tedi for up
to nine months (Kerr 1999, 57); problematic political circumstances, which saw
the government fall out with international banks that did not regard Papua New
Guinea as being a reliable borrower (Standish 2000, 1); and a legacy of exploita-
tive colonial structures.
14 Of particular note in enhancing this negative reputation were the 1997
Sandline crises; the increasingly fluid and unstable Melanesian politics, marked by
Skate’s tumultuous, constant reshuffling of cabinet and of the public service; the
release of the Mujo Sefa videotapes showing Skate discussing bribes (followed by
the “Jack Daniels Defense”: “I was drunk”); the June 1998 Lucas allegations;
growing tensions with Australia, Indonesia, and Solomon Islands; and increasing
tension between the PNG government and the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, which eventually degenerated to a temporary but complete halt in
relations. See Hayashida 1997; Kerr 1999; de Groot 1999; Nelson 1999; and
Dorney 2000.
15 Component groups included Assemblies of God, Christian Books Melane-
sia, Christian Brethren Churches, Christian Revival Crusade, Evangelical Brother-
hood Church, Evangelical Mission International, Four Square Christian Church,
Liebenzell Mission International, New Tribes Mission, Overseas Bible Mission,
Pacific Island Ministries, Revival Crusade International, Seventh-day Adventist,
and South Seas Evangelical Church. In addition, contributing organizations
included the Evangelical Alliance of Japan, Evangelical Alliance of Papua New
Guinea, Missionary Aviation Fellowship PNG, and tear Australia.
16 Some cco workers did have professional qualifications—for instance, in
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management, accountancy, or pastoral care—but none were professionally quali-
fied in the disaster relief or development area.
17 cbc women were sometimes asked to help with relief aid—including deliv-
ering women’s clothing, counseling other women (in keeping with the regulations
that forbade men to be alone with women), offering child care, and sewing clothes
—but the general pattern appears to be that women were rarely involved in cco
activities or administration (David Aiwung, pers comm, 20 June 2001).
18 The Jesus Film is an American dramatization of the life of Jesus, used glob-
ally as an evangelistic tool by evangelical groups.
19 This interpretation did not necessarily dominate immediately following
the disaster event (Bogdan Zieba, pers comm, 24 Aug 2001; Kawata and others
1999, 101) but during Fountain’s stay in ples bagarap and Aitape it was clearly
the most widely expressed analysis of the cause of the event. The view that God
was punishing the people for their impiety appears to have been expressed quite
early on by the disaster victims (Calverley 1998, 6; Dengler and Preuss 1998;
Kawata and others 1999, 101; Bogdan Zieba, pers comm, 24 Aug 2001), but this
explanation was not articulated by anyone from ples bagarap during the period
of Fountain’s research.
20 For descriptions of compensation within the context of resource extraction
in Papua New Guinea, see the collection of papers edited by Susan Toft (1997).
21 Although a number of different views were also suggested during field
research—including from some of the more influential members of the organi-
zation—only the dominant view is analyzed here.
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Abstract
This paper considers the links between religion and disaster relief through a
detailed case study of the activities of Christian churches following the Aitape tsu-
nami of 1998 in northwest Papua New Guinea. Based on primary fieldwork data,
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we argue that Christian religion was central to the way in which the Combined
Churches Organization conducted its relief work and to why it sought to under-
take it in the first place. A comparison of the perspectives of this organization and
of other religious and governmental organizations as to the causes of this disaster
and what remedies they should undertake suggests that greater attention should
be paid—both by aid and development researchers and practitioners—to aspects
of religious belief and the way they inform theory and practice. Much remains to
explore concerning the ways religion informs the theory and practice of aid and
development, particularly in the Pacific. Through the detailed case study offered
here, this paper adds to the fledgling debate engaging with the links between reli-
gion and development and calls for the initiation of an agenda toward that end. 
keywords: Christianity, aid and development, disaster relief, Melanesia, Aitape
tsunami
